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Abstract
We investigate a diﬀerential duopoly game where each firm, through capital accu-
mulation over time, may invest both in persuasive advertising campaigns aimed at
increasing the willingness to pay of consumers and in an R&D process aimed at in-
creasing the level of own product quality. In contrast with the acquired wisdom based
on static models, the firm providing the market with the inferior variety may earn
higher profits than the rival. More than this, we show that there exists a range of
parameters wherein the low quality firm commands monopoly power.
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1 Introduction
In this final chapter, we aim at investigating a dynamic advertising model under
vertical diﬀerentiation.1 The scanty literature currently available in this field usually
considers advertising as in instrument to convey information about the existence
and the characteristics of the advertised good or as a way to increase the stock of
goodwill or reputation (Kotowitz and Mathewson, 1979; Conrad, 1985; Ringbeck,
1985). Two exemptions dealing with a full information setting are in Ouardighi
and Pasin (2002), extending the well known Lanchester model to account for the
interplay between market shares and quality, and in Colombo and Lambertini (2003),
assuming a direct relationship between advertising eﬀorts and the rate of change
in sales, as in Vidale and Wolfe (1957), under endogenous vertical diﬀerentiation.2
Others have investigated, adopting either static or dynamic approaches, the strategic
use of product qualities as firms instruments to build up market shares (Moorthy,
1988; Motta, 1993; Dutta et al., 1995).
In line of principle, the informative role played by advertising is plausible only
in a world where the dissemination of information is scarce and where some product
characteristics are not perfectly observable by consumers before purchase. Many
goods that are actually advertised in modern economies, however, seem to be at
odds with this world. Examples abound. Indeed, when the informative gap between
producers and consumers is either negligible or, whatever it is, it cannot be reduced
by advertising, the informative and signaling role of advertising becomes so marginal
that it can not be justified from a theoretical point of view. For instance, the exact
formula of Coca Cola is still unknown and, presumably, so it will remain in the
foreseeable future. Accordingly, the focus of Coca Cola’s advertising campaigns is
not information. In this context, the unique theoretical explanation of the fact that
huge amounts of money are spent by firms in advertising campaigns, is that either
advertising acts so as to increase the marginal willingness to pay of consumers for
the advertised good, or the consequence of a prisoners’ dilemma generated by the
presence of rival firms (like Pepsi) adopting similar strategies. The subject matter of
this chapter is the first of the two possibilities.3 Having said that, a natural question
should come into mind: why perfectly informed (and perfectly rational) consumers
should be ready to pay more for a good the characteristics of which, included the
price vector, are common knowledge? The answer is that even if all the physical
characteristics of the good remain unchanged by the fact of being advertised, the
psychological responses of consumers are not.
As perfectly recognized by Galbraith (1967, ch. XVIII), advertising in modern
1For exhaustive surveys on dynamic advertising, see Sethi (1977); Jørgensen (1982); Feichtinger
and Jørgensen (1983); Erickson (1991); Feichtinger et al. (1994).
2For the formulation of the Lanchester model, see Dockner et al. (2000, ch. 11), Case (1979),
Sorger (1989) and Erickson (1991).
3For the analysis of the first perspective, where advertising aims at attracting additional con-
sumers, see Colombo and Lambertini (2003).
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economies is much more concerned with being persuasive rather than informative,
where being persuasive means being able to add extra values to the advertised good
by conferring to its owner a sense of personal achievement, social recognition, beauty,
by diverting his mind from thought, or by being in whatever other manner psycho-
logically rewarding.
In Galbraith‘s vein, we assume that advertising makes perfectly informed con-
sumers more willing to pay for the good being advertised. We investigate a diﬀeren-
tial game in order to study the dynamic incentives for oligopolistic firms to invest in
such persuasive advertising campaigns coupled with product quality improvements,
which are the result of capital accumulation over time. For the sake of expositional
homogeneity, we adopt the same structure of consumers’ preferences as the one which
has been used throughout the book. We characterize both open-loop and closed-loop
memory less Nash equilibria, and proceed to a steady state (saddle path) analysis.
Our main results can be summarized as follows: in line with the existing static liter-
ature on product quality provision in oligopoly (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979, 1980;
Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983; Lehmann-Grube, 1997, inter alia), we show that the
high quality firm serves more customers and invests more than the low quality firm.
However, the resulting ranking of firms’ profits may significantly diﬀer from the one
we are accustomed with from the aforementioned literature. More precisely, there ex-
ists an admissible subset of parameters wherein the low quality firm performs better
than the high quality firm in terms of equilibrium profits. Moreover, we prove that
it is possible for the low quality firm to become a monopolist, provided that future
profits suﬃciently matter.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The model is described in
section 2. Section 3 deals with the solution of the game under both open-loop and
closed-loop memory less solution concept. Concluding remarks are in section 4.
2 The Model
Time is continuous and indicated by t. At each t ∈ [0,∞), a market for vertically
diﬀerentiated goods exists. Let this market be supplied by two single-product firms
oﬀering goods of quality qi (t) at a price pi (t), with i = H,L, with ∞ > qH (t) ≥
qL (t) ≥ 0 at any t. Production exhibits constant returns to scale and, without any
loss of generality, we normalize the unit production cost to zero.
On the demand side, each consumer is characterized by a marginal willingness
to pay for quality θ, uniformly distributed over the support [Θ (t) − 1,Θ (t)], with
Θ (t) > 1 at any t. We assume f(θ) = 1, implying that consumers’ population
is normalized to 1.4 For the sake of simplicity, we abstract from the presence of
switching costs, so customers that, as time goes by, switch from one variety to the
4At each point in time, each consumer buys at most one unit of the preferred variety. This rules
out the use of second-degree price discrimination.
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other, bear any disutility.5
The instantaneous net surplus a consumer of type θ draws from the variety char-
acterized by qi (t) is defined as follows:
Uθ (t) =
½
θqi(t)− pi(t) ≥ 0 if he buys variety i = H,L
0 if he doesn’t buy
(1)
In order to derive the expressions of market demands, we compute the threshold
value of θ characterising the consumer who is indiﬀerent between buying the high
quality good and buying the low quality good:
bθ (t) = pH (t)− pL (t)
qH (t)− qL (t)
, (2)
and the one which characterizes the consumer who is indiﬀerent between buying the
low quality good and not buying at all:
eθ (t) = pL (t)
qL (t)
. (3)
Accordingly, the direct demand system obtains:
xH (t) = Θ (t)− bθ (t) ; (4)
xL (t) = bθ (t)− eθ (t) , (5)
which can be inverted as long as partial market coverage prevails, i.e. eθ (t) > 0:
pH (t) = qH (t) [Θ (t)− xH (t)]− qL (t)xL (t) ; (6)
pL (t) = qL (t) [Θ (t)− xH (t)− xL (t)] . (7)
Firm i’s instantaneous profits write:
πH(t) = pH(t)xH (t)− [aH (t)]2 − [bH (t)]2 ; (8)
πL(t) = pL(t)xL (t)− [aL (t)]2 − [bL (t)]2 , (9)
where [ai (t)]
2 and [bi (t)]
2 are the instantaneous quadratic costs associated with per-
suasive advertising campaigns and product quality improvements, respectively; ai(t)
denotes the instantaneous investments in persuasive advertising campaigns made by
firm i at time t, and bi(t) denotes the instantaneous R&D investments in product
quality improvements made by firm i at time t.
We assume that the quality of firm i’s product evolves over time according to the
following dynamics:
dqi (t)
dt
≡ ·qi = bi (t)− δqi (t) , i = {H,L} , (10)
5For an exhaustive survey on consumers’ switching costs, see Klemperer (1995).
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while the upper bound of the support in which the marginal willingness to pay for
quality lies evolves over time according to the following dynamics:
dΘ (t)
dt
≡
·
Θ = aH (t) + aL (t)− δΘ (t) , (11)
where δ > 0 denotes the common depreciation rate.6 It is worth noting the diﬀer-
ences in structure between (10) and (11): while the quality of firm i’s product evolves
over time independently of firm j‘s product quality and investment, the dynamics of
Θ features non rival properties which are typical of public goods. In this respect,
the eﬀects induced by individual advertising campaigns consist in making not only
own consumers, but all the consumers in the market more quality-oriented, including
those whose willingness to pay for quality is still too low to buy.7 It is also interest-
ing to compare (10) with its analogous counterpart of last chapter. There, quality
depreciation was assumed to be nil for firm L, while here we assume that quality
depreciates at the rate δ for both firms.
The objective of firm i consists in maximising the present value of its profits
stream over an infinite time horizon w.r.t. controls ai (t) , bi (t) and xi (t), under the
constraint given by states dynamics:
max
ai(t),bi(t),xi(t)
Πi(t) =
Z ∞
0
πi(t)e
−ρtdt
s.t.
dqi (t)
dt
≡ ·qi = bi (t)− δqi (t) , i = {H,L}
and
dΘ (t)
dt
≡
·
Θ = aH (t) + aL (t)− δΘ (t) .
(12)
The discount rate ρ > 0 is assumed to be constant and common to both firms.
3 The game
Firm i’s current value Hamiltonian writes:
Hi(t) = e−ρt ·
½
πi(t) + λii(t)
·
qi + λij(t)
·
qj + νi (t)
·
Θ (t)
¾
, (13)
where λii(t) = µii (t) e
ρt, λij(t) = µij (t) e
ρt and νi (t) = κi (t) e
ρt; µii (t) and µij (t) are
the co-state variable associated to qi (t) and κi (t) is the co-state variable associated to
Θ (t). Firms play simultaneously in each point in time. First order conditions (FOCs)
6The assumption that parameter δ is the same for both quality and the marginal willingness
to pay is not at all crucial, and has been made only to end up with more tractable solutions than
otherwise.
7A diﬀerential game where firms’ advertsing campaigns have a public good nature is in Cellini
and Lambertini (2003).
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on controls are (henceforth, the indication of time and exponential discounting are
omitted for brevity):8
∂HH
∂xH
= ΘqH − 2qHxH − qLxL = 0 ; (14)
∂HL
∂xL
= qL (Θ− xH − 2xL) = 0 ; (15)
∂Hi
∂ai
= −2ai + λii = 0 , i = H,L ; (16)
∂Hi
∂bi
= −2bi + λii = 0 , i = H,L . (17)
The above FOCs, in particular equations (14) and (15), imply that, by applying
the open-loop solution concept to the present game, we end up with equilibria which
are not subgame perfect.9 As argued in the previous chapter, this can be justified by
considering that, in some circumstances, it may be too costly for firms to modify their
investment plans on the way. Notice also that FOCs do not contain λij because of
the assumptions concerning the state equations, characterised by separated dynamics.
Therefore, we set λij = 0 for all t ∈ [0,∞) and j 6= i, and specify only two co-state
equations per firm, disregarding the one pertaining to the rival’s quality. We first
solve the game in the open-loop form. Then, in order to characterize equilibria that
are strongly time consistent, we will solve the game according to the closed-loop
memoryless solution concept.
3.1 Open-Loop Equilibrium
Under the open-loop solution concept, by definition, feedback eﬀects are not taken
into account. The relevant co-state equations write as follows:
−∂Hi
∂qi
=
∂λii
∂t
− ρλii ⇔ (18)
∂λii
∂t
= (ρ+ δ)λii − (Θ− xH)xH
−∂Hi
∂Θ
=
∂νi
∂t
− ρνi ⇔ (19)
∂νi
∂t
= (ρ+ δ)µi − qHxH
8Second order conditions are met throughout the paper. They are omitted for brevity.
9See, e.g., Mehlman and Willig (1983), Reinganum (1982), Dockner, Feichtinger and Jørgensen
(1985) and Fershtman (1987). For an exhaustive discussion on the coincidence between open-loop
and closed-loop memoryless solutions, see Dockner et al. (2000, ch.7).
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along with the transversality conditions:
lim
t→∞
µi(t) · qi(t) = 0 and lim
t→∞
κi (t) ·Θ(t) = 0, i = H,L (20)
and the initial conditions
qi(0) = qi0 > 0, with qH0 > qL0 and Θ(0) = Θ0 ≥ 1. (21)
Solving (14-15) yields the equilibrium output levels for a generic quality pair:
x∗H = Θ
µ
1− 2qH
4qH − qL
¶
; x∗L =
ΘqH
4qH − qL
, (22)
with x∗H > x
∗
L > 0 for all qH > qL > 0. If qH = qL, p
∗
H = p
∗
L = 0 and the allocation of
market demand across firms is not determined. Notice that, since output levels do not
appear in the state dynamics, the optimal solution obtained through the Hamiltonian
coincides with the static ones (see section 2 of the previous chapter).
From (16) and (17) we obtain:
λii = 2ai ⇒
·
λii = 2
·
ai; (23)
µii = 2bi ⇒
·
µii = 2
·
bi. (24)
Now, by plugging (23) into (18) and (24) into (19), and using (22), we derive the
dynamics of firm H’s investments:
·
aH = aH (δ + ρ) +
ΘqH (qL − 2qH)
8qH − 2qL
; (25)
·
bH = bH (δ + ρ) +
Θ2qH (qL − 2qH)
(qL − 4qH)2
, (26)
and those referred to firm L:
·
aL = aL (δ + ρ)−
ΘqHqL
8qH − 2qL
; (27)
·
bL = bL (δ + ρ)−
Θ2q2H
2 (qL − 4qH)2
. (28)
The dynamic system formed by (25), (26), (27) and (28), together with the state
equations (10) and (11), yields the following admissible steady state point:10
aOLH = 4.6629δ
2 (δ + ρ) ; aOLL = 0.80002δ
2 (δ + ρ) ; (29)
bOLH = 3.7071δ
2 (δ + ρ) ; bOLL = 1.0858δ
2 (δ + ρ) ; (30)
ΘOL = 5.4629δ (δ + ρ) ; qOLH = 3.7071δ (δ + ρ) ; q
OL
L = 1.0858δ (δ + ρ) . (31)
10We find four equilibria, only the one reported in the text being admissible. Among the other
three critical points, two are non real and one does not respect the condition qH > qL.
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Proposition 1 The steady state defined by {aOLH , aOLH , bOLH , bOLL ,ΘOL, qOLH , qOLL } is a
saddle point equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix
By a direct comparison between equilibrium qualities and investments, we can
write:
Lemma 2 Under the open-loop solution concept, firm H invests more than firm L
both in advertising and in quality improvement.
Concerning equilibrium output levels, we have:
xOLH = 2.5156δ (δ + ρ) ; x
OL
L = 1.4736δ (δ + ρ) , (32)
which are admissible iﬀ xOLH + x
OL
L < 1. This condition is satisfied iﬀ:
ρ < ρ = −1.0027× 10−4−2500 + 9973δ
2
δ
. (33)
Equilibrium prices are:
pOLH = 9.3259δ
2 (δ + ρ)2 ; pOLL = 1.6001δ
2 (δ + ρ)2 . (34)
Lemma 3 Under the open-loop solution concept, firm H attains a larger market
share and charges a higher market price than firm L.
We are now in a position to assess the relative performance of firms in terms of
equilibrium profits:
πOLH = 23.46δ
3 (δ + ρ)3 − 35.485δ4 (δ + ρ)2 ; (35)
πOLL = 2.357 9δ
3 (δ + ρ)3 − 1.819δ4 (δ + ρ)2 . (36)
The sustainability of either the monopoly or the duopoly regime depends upon the
non-negativity of profits, which, in turns, depends upon intertemporal parameters.
In this respect, our main result is as follows:
Proposition 4 Provided that ρ < ρ, ensuring that partial market coverage prevails,
under the open-loop solution concept the following holds:
(i) ρ < 0.51257δ ⇒ πOLL > 0, πOLH < 0
(ii) ρ ∈ (0.51257δ, 0.59539δ]⇒ πOLL > πOLH > 0
(iii) ρ > 0.59539δ ⇒ πOLH > πOLL > 0.
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The following figure illustrates the above Proposition:
Figure 1 : Parameter Space
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In region (i), only the low quality firm survives. In region (ii), the market is
served by both firms; yet, contrary to the conventional wisdom coming from the
existing static literature, the low quality firm outperforms the high quality firm in
terms of equilibrium profits. Finally, in region (iii), we find the traditional (or quasi-
static) result on the distribution of profits in a setting where quality improvements
require capital accumulation to take place and consumers’ preferences are aﬀected by
firms’ advertising campaigns carried out over time. This is in accordance with the
fact that, as the discount rate becomes higher, firms become increasingly myopic, and
the dynamic game is perceived as closer to the static one.
3.2 Closed-Loop Memory Less Equilibrium
Now, we write firm i’s co-state equations according to the closed-loop memory less
solution concept:
−∂Hi
∂qi
− ∂Hi
∂xj
∂x∗j
∂qi
− ∂Hi
∂aj
∂a∗j
∂qi
− ∂Hi
∂bj
∂b∗j
∂qi
=
∂λii
∂t
− ρλii ; (37)
−∂Hi
∂Θ
− ∂Hi
∂xj
∂x∗j
∂Θ
− ∂Hi
∂aj
∂a∗j
∂Θ
− ∂Hi
∂bj
∂b∗j
∂Θ
=
∂νi
∂t
− ρνi , (38)
where starred variables indicate that partial derivatives are obtained using FOCs,
along with the same transversality and initial conditions as in open-loop. First,
notice that:
∂a∗j
∂qi
=
∂b∗j
∂qi
= 0 ;
∂a∗j
∂Θ
=
∂b∗j
∂Θ
= 0 , (39)
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meaning that the only feedbacks that have to be taken into account are those regard-
ing optimal output levels:
∂Hi
∂xj
= qLxi ;
∂x∗H
∂qL
= − xL
2qH
;
∂x∗L
∂qH
= 0 ;
∂x∗j
∂Θ
=
1
2
. (40)
Now, by plugging (23) into (37) and (24) into (38), and using equilibrium sales (22),
we derive the dynamics of firm H‘s investments:
·
aH = aH (δ + ρ) +Θ
µ
qL
4
− q
2
H
4qH − qL
¶
; (41)
·
bH = bH (δ + ρ) +
Θ2qH (qL − 2qH)
(qL − 4qH)2
, (42)
and those referred to firm L:
·
aL = aL (δ + ρ)−
ΘqHqL
4 (4qH − qL)
; (43)
·
bL = bL (δ + ρ)−
Θ2qH (2qH + qL)
4 (qL − 4qH)2
. (44)
The dynamic system formed by (41), (42), (43) and (44), together with the state
equations (10) and (11), yields the following admissible steady state point:11
aCLH = 5.478δ
2 (δ + ρ) ; aCLL = 0.73208δ
2 (δ + ρ) ; (45)
bCLH = 4.7735δ
2 (δ + ρ) ; bCLL = 1.7166δ
2 (δ + ρ) ; (46)
ΘCL = 6.21δ (δ + ρ) ; qCLH = 4.7735δ (δ + ρ) ; q
CL
L = 1.7166δ (δ + ρ) . (47)
Proposition 5 The steady state defined by {aCLH , aCLH , bCLH , bCLL ,ΘCL, qCLH , qCLL } is sad-
dle point equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix
By a direct comparison between equilibrium qualities and investments we can
write:
Lemma 6 Under the closed-loop memoryless solution concept, firm H invests more
than firm L both in advertising and in quality improvement.
11As for the open-loop case, we find four equilibria, only the one reported in the text being
admissible.
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Equilibrium output and price levels turn out to be:
xCLH = 2.7983δ (δ + ρ) ; x
CL
L = 1.7059δ (δ + ρ) ; (48)
pCLH = 13.357δ
2 (δ + ρ)2 ; pCLL = 2.9282δ
2 (δ + ρ)2 , (49)
provided that xCLH + x
CL
L < 1. Partial market coverage prevails iﬀ:
ρ < ρ = −2.0× 10−10−1.1101× 10
9 + 5.0× 109δ2
δ
. (50)
Lemma 7 Under the closed-loop memoryless solution concept, firm H attains a
larger market share and charges a higher market price than firm L.
As in the previous case, we may assess the relative performance of firms in terms
of equilibrium profits:
πCLH = 37.377δ
3 (δ + ρ)3 − 52.795δ4 (δ + ρ)2 ; (51)
πCLL = 4.9952δ
3 (δ + ρ)3 − 3.4827δ4 (δ + ρ)2 . (52)
From a direct comparison between (51) and (52) we obtain:
Proposition 8 Provided that ρ < ρ, ensuring that partial market coverage prevails,
under the closed-loop memoryless solution concept the following holds:
(i) ρ < 0.4125δ ⇒ πCLL > 0, πCLH < 0
(ii) ρ ∈ (0.4125δ, 0.52282δ]⇒ πCLL > πCLH > 0
(iii) ρ > 0.52282δ ⇒ πCLH > πCLL > 0.
The above Proposition is qualitatively equivalent to Proposition 4. Therefore,
also in the closed-loop case, there exists a range of parameters wherein the low qual-
ity firm performs better than the high quality firm in terms of equilibrium profits.
Furthermore, in contrast with the so-called finiteness property (Shaked and Sutton,
1983), the firm providing the market with the inferior variety may become a natural
monopolist.12
As to the comparison between open- and closed-loop equilibria, it is self-evident
from (31) and (47) that the marginal willingness to pay and the level of product
quality for both varieties are higher in the closed-loop case. Moreover,
12In the diﬀerential game model at stake, contrary to what we have seen in the previous chapter,
the so-called 4/7 rule (Choi and Shin, 1992) never obtains, under either solution concept. Of course,
this is due to the fact that firms behave a` la Cournot. It is worth noting, however, that in Choi
and Shin’s model the quantity-setting behaviour would entail product homogeneity, with both firms
supplying the highest feasible quality.
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Corollary 9 The degree of vertical diﬀerentiation is larger at the closed-loop equilib-
rium than at the open-loop one.
To see this it suﬃces to carry out a straightforward computation, from which we
get qOLL /q
OL
H = 0.2929 and q
CL
L /q
CL
H = 0.35961. So, the ‘closed-loop motive’, whereby
firms explicitly take into consideration the rivals’ behaviour as the game unravels over
time, translates here into a wider product variety.
However, unlike the conventional wisdom according to which firms make greater
investment eﬀorts under closed-loop than under open-loop strategies (see Reynolds,
1987, inter alia), the firm providing the inferior quality makes a lower eﬀort in the
advertising activity when feedback eﬀects are taken into account. This result depends
on the fact that the benefits from any increase in consumers’ marginal willingness
to pay cannot be internalised, and spill over to the other firm. Indeed, the high
quality firm invests much more in closed- than in open-loop yielding greater positive
externalities to the rival. Equilibrium sales and market prices are always higher at
the closed-loop equilibrium. A non-trivial result is that equilibrium profits are also
higher in the closed-loop case than in the open-loop one. This is due to the fact that
higher eﬀorts (at least in quality supply) are adequately counterbalanced by larger
revenues brought about by the increase in the marginal willingness to pay.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have investigated a diﬀerential duopoly game where each firm, through capital
accumulation over time, may invest both in persuasive advertising campaigns aimed
at increasing the willingness to pay of consumers and in an R&D process aimed at
increasing the level of own product quality. The willingness to pay of consumers
and the levels of product qualities have been treated as state variables evolving (in
continuous time) in response to the interplay between firms’ investments and decay
rates. Unlike multi-stage games, diﬀerential games are particularly suitable to shed
light on the nature of investments, which is inherently a dynamic one. To the best
of our knowledge, the model presented in this chapter represents the first attempt to
capture formally the dynamic incentives for oligopolistic firms to devote resources to
advertising campaigns and quality improvements, jointly.
The main result we have obtained is that, in contrast with the acquired wisdom
based on static models, the firm providing the market with the inferior variety may
earn higher profits than the rival. Furthermore, we have shown that there exists a
range of parameters wherein the low quality firm commands monopoly power. The
rationale for these results is that, while in a static setting there are only instantaneous
production costs, and we know from the existing static literature that it is always
more profitable to produce the superior variety, in our dynamic setting things are
much more involved: quality production and improvement require firms to make
increasing eﬀorts in each point in time, due to the assumption on dynamic decreasing
11
returns w.r.t. the investment technology. Indeed, in the long run, it may become
too costly for firms not only to produce but also to maintain a high quality level.
This occurs when the discount rate is very small compared to the decay rate, i.e.
future profits matter almost as present ones. When, instead, future profits are highly
discounted, we come back to a quasi-static world where the relevant time horizon is
perceived as a very short one due to the myopic attitude of firms, thus confirming
the conventional static wisdom.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
We are interested in the dynamic system formed by (25), (26), (27), (28) and the
state equations (10), (11). To verify that the steady state point defined in Proposition
1 is stable along a saddle path, we consider the following 7× 7 matrix:
ΩOL =


∂
·
Θ
∂Θ
∂
·
Θ
∂qH
∂
·
Θ
∂qL
∂
·
Θ
∂aH
∂
·
Θ
∂aL
∂
·
Θ
∂bH
∂
·
Θ
∂bL
∂
·
qH
∂Θ
∂
·
qH
∂qH
∂
·
qH
∂qL
∂
·
qH
∂aH
∂
·
qH
∂aL
∂
·
qH
∂bH
∂
·
qH
∂bL
∂
·
qL
∂Θ
∂
·
qL
∂qH
∂
·
qL
∂qL
∂
·
qL
∂aH
∂
·
qL
∂aL
∂
·
qL
∂bH
∂
·
qL
∂bL
∂
·
aH
∂Θ
∂
·
aH
∂qH
∂
·
aH
∂qL
∂
·
aH
∂aH
∂
·
aH
∂aL
∂
·
aH
∂bH
∂
·
aH
∂bL
∂
·
aL
∂Θ
∂
·
aL
∂qH
∂
·
aL
∂qL
∂
·
aL
∂aH
∂
·
aL
∂aL
∂
·
aL
∂bH
∂
·
aL
∂bL
∂
·
bH
∂Θ
∂
·
bH
∂qH
∂
·
bH
∂qL
∂
·
bH
∂aH
∂
·
bH
∂aL
∂
·
bH
∂bH
∂
·
bH
∂bL
∂
·
bL
∂Θ
∂
·
bL
∂qH
∂
·
bL
∂qL
∂
·
bL
∂aH
∂
·
bL
∂aL
∂
·
bL
∂bH
∂
·
bL
∂bL


qOLi ,ΘOL
By computing the seven eigenvalues, we find that at least one is negative over the
entire admissible range of parameters:
ξ = 0. 5ρ− 0. 321 8
q
8δ2 + 8δρ+ 2. 414 2ρ2 < 0
while at least one is positive:
ξ = δ + ρ > 0
Therefore, the steady state is a saddle point equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 5.
We are interested in the dynamic system formed by (41), (42), (43), (44) and the
state equations (10), (11). To verify that the steady state point defined in Proposition
5 is stable along a saddle path, we consider the following 7× 7 matrix:
ΩCL =


∂
·
Θ
∂Θ
∂
·
Θ
∂qH
∂
·
Θ
∂qL
∂
·
Θ
∂aH
∂
·
Θ
∂aL
∂
·
Θ
∂bH
∂
·
Θ
∂bL
∂
·
qH
∂Θ
∂
·
qH
∂qH
∂
·
qH
∂qL
∂
·
qH
∂aH
∂
·
qH
∂aL
∂
·
qH
∂bH
∂
·
qH
∂bL
∂
·
qL
∂Θ
∂
·
qL
∂qH
∂
·
qL
∂qL
∂
·
qL
∂aH
∂
·
qL
∂aL
∂
·
qL
∂bH
∂
·
qL
∂bL
∂
·
aH
∂Θ
∂
·
aH
∂qH
∂
·
aH
∂qL
∂
·
aH
∂aH
∂
·
aH
∂aL
∂
·
aH
∂bH
∂
·
aH
∂bL
∂
·
aL
∂Θ
∂
·
aL
∂qH
∂
·
aL
∂qL
∂
·
aL
∂aH
∂
·
aL
∂aL
∂
·
aL
∂bH
∂
·
aL
∂bL
∂
·
bH
∂Θ
∂
·
bH
∂qH
∂
·
bH
∂qL
∂
·
bH
∂aH
∂
·
bH
∂aL
∂
·
bH
∂bH
∂
·
bH
∂bL
∂
·
bL
∂Θ
∂
·
bL
∂qH
∂
·
bL
∂qL
∂
·
bL
∂aH
∂
·
bL
∂aL
∂
·
bL
∂bH
∂
·
bL
∂bL


qCLi ,ΘCL
=


−δ 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 −δ 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 −δ 0 0 0 1
−0.882δ(δ + ρ) −1.537δ(δ + ρ) 1.084δ(δ + ρ) δ + ρ 0 0 0
−0.118δ(δ + ρ) 0.0151δ(δ + ρ) −0.468δ(δ + ρ) 0 δ + ρ δ + ρ δ + ρ
−1.537δ(δ + ρ) −0.0217δ(δ + ρ) 0.0602δ(δ + ρ) 0 0 δ + ρ 0
−0.553δ(δ + ρ) 0.126δ(δ + ρ) −0.350δ(δ + ρ) 0 0 0 δ + ρ


Again, computing the seven eigenvalues we find that at least one is negative and at
least one is positive over the entire admissible parameter range. Therefore, the steady
state equilibrium is a saddle point. We omit the expressions of eigenvalues since they
are cumbersome. Anyway, they are available upon request.
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